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This is a segment from the 0xResearch newsletter. To read full editions, <\/em>subscribe<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n The Bybit $1.4 billion exploit triggered a predictable response: an influx of security and infrastructure firms each claiming that their technology could have prevented the attack.<\/p>\n The FBI has confirmed<\/a> the hack was the work of North Korea\u2019s Lazarus Group, which targeted Bybit\u2019s Safe{Wallet} setup. A key detail disclosed<\/a> yesterday is that it was a Safe developer\u2019s machine<\/a> \u2014 and not Bybit\u2019s infrastructure \u2014 that was compromised, allowing attackers to inject malicious code into the transaction signing interface.<\/p>\n The deception resulted in Bybit\u2019s signers blindly approving a fraudulent transaction, draining its largest Ethereum wallet.<\/p>\n Security researcher Taylor Monahan emphasized that this attack was entirely predictable given the crypto industry\u2019s long-standing blind-signing problem. As she noted<\/a>: \u201cThere is NO org in this space that is taking security seriously enough to protect against a dedicated, persistent, motivated adversary like Lazarus.\u201d<\/p>\n Key findings include:<\/p>\n Safe{Wallet}\u2019s UI was compromised \u2014 Bybit\u2019s interface showed an expected transaction, but signers unknowingly approved a completely different transaction.<\/p>\n Blind signing on Ledger devices was the final failure \u2014 Bybit\u2019s final signer, Ben Zhou, admitted he didn\u2019t verify the transaction fully on his Ledger hardware wallet before approving it.<\/p>\n The attack targeted human oversight \u2014 Lazarus didn\u2019t need to exploit smart contracts or break cryptographic security; it simply took advantage of trust in the UI.<\/p>\n Former Binance CEO CZ criticized Safe\u2019s response<\/a>, raising critical questions like why did a single developer\u2019s machine have access to Bybit\u2019s transaction process? How did Ledger\u2019s signing process fail to prevent this? And what security lessons<\/a> should the industry take away?<\/p>\n These are all good questions<\/a> which will take some time to fully address.<\/p>\n With every high-profile hack, companies flood the space claiming their product would have stopped it. Some address the specific issue \u2014 secure transaction verification \u2014 while others hijack the narrative for marketing.<\/p>\n Claim<\/strong>: Browser extensions and private key management are the weak links. OISY eliminates them by running fully onchain.<\/p>\n Reality<\/strong>: The attack had nothing to do with browser extensions or private key exposure \u2014 it was blind signing. OISY\u2019s architecture might be novel, but it doesn\u2019t solve the problem that caused this hack.<\/p>\n Claim<\/strong>: Centralized cloud services (like AWS) were the root cause of the exploit.<\/p>\n Reality<\/strong>: While decentralized cloud storage can reduce attack surfaces, Bybit wasn\u2019t hacked through AWS. The issue was Safe\u2019s UI manipulation and blind signing \u2014 not the particular choice of cloud hosting provider.<\/p>\n Claim<\/strong>: Enforcing strict signing policies, such as pre-approved addresses, governance delays and multi-factor authentication would have blocked this exploit.<\/p>\n Reality<\/strong>: This is actually relevant. If Bybit had enforced signing restrictions, Lazarus wouldn\u2019t have been able to trick it into blind-signing a malicious transaction.<\/p>\n Claim<\/strong>: Bybit\u2019s security model was fundamentally flawed \u2014 Ledger\u2019s blind-signing requirement combined with Safe\u2019s UI vulnerability left it open to attack. Fireblocks argues that its MPC-based infrastructure, policy engines and real-time transaction verification would have mitigated this risk.<\/p>\n Reality<\/strong>: This claim is one of the more valid responses. Fireblocks\u2019 policy enforcement would have prevented arbitrary approvals, requiring predefined transaction rules that block unexpected transactions \u2014 even if signers get tricked.<\/p>\n However, there\u2019s also a risk, as Taylor Monahan put it<\/a> in her characteristically sassy style. \u201cFancy multisig, semi-custodial, MPC, blah blah blah product\u2026make your attack surface LARGER, not smaller.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n The real lesson is UI trust is the biggest security hole. Bybit\u2019s attack wasn\u2019t about smart contracts, decentralization or private key security \u2014 it was about blind trust<\/a> in a compromised UI.<\/p>\n In crypto, don\u2019t trust, verify. Otherwise, you defeat the purpose of using hardware wallets in the first place. Every solution that ignores this reality is missing the point.<\/p>\n For all the noise about decentralized cloud storage, onchain wallets and browserless interfaces, when billions of dollars are at stake, none of this matters if you don\u2019t have:<\/p>\n As Lazarus continues evolving, the crypto industry must stop chasing trendy fixes and focus instead on hardening transaction security \u2014 because apparently the next $1.4 billion hack is just one blind signature away.<\/p>\n Get the news in your inbox. Explore Blockworks newsletters:<\/strong><\/p>\n This is a segment from the 0xResearch newsletter. To read full editions, subscribe. The Bybit $1.4 billion exploit triggered a predictable response: an influx of security and infrastructure firms each claiming that their technology could have prevented the attack. The FBI has confirmed the hack was the work of North Korea\u2019s Lazarus Group, which targeted […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":376521,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[230,225,221,227,226,228,229,60,223,224,222],"class_list":["post-376519","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cryptocurrency","tag-brave","tag-coinbase","tag-crypto","tag-decentralised","tag-decentralized","tag-decentralized-exchange","tag-erc-20","tag-featured","tag-meme-coin","tag-robinhood","tag-solana"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/376519","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=376519"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/376519\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":376522,"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/376519\/revisions\/376522"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/376521"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=376519"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=376519"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dripp.zone\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=376519"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nA wave of companies rushes in<\/h2>\n
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